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LAENG v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD: RECOVERY FOR
A JOB TRYOUT
Workmen's compensation was one of the first major social wel-
fare programs1 proposed in the beginning of the twentieth century.'
This novel, progressive social legislation statutorily imposed strict lia-
bility on the employer for employees who suffered injuries while in
the course of their employment. Proposed in the face of economic
growth born of the Industrial Revolution, its inception was in an at-
mosphere of controversy and compromise.3 One of the most contro-
versial issues centered on the scope of compensation coverage. 4  Who
was to be considered an "employee" covered by workmen's compensa-
tion insurance?
The legal significance of the concept of employee in early com-
mon law was chiefly to ascertain the scope of an employer-master's vi-
carious tort liability for the acts of his employee-servant. Early inter-
pretations of workmen's compensation coverage were restricted when
the courts superimposed this narrow common law concept upon legis-
lative intent.5  Such an application of the master-servant concept to
limit the compensation coverage of an employee misstated the social
insurance nature of workmen's compensation that separated it from
1. Comment, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 161, 164 (1962). See generally Grillo, Fifty
Years of Workmen's Compensation-An Historical Review, 38 CONN. B.J. 239 (1964);
Note, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 85 (1935).
2. Between 1913 and 1920, all but six states passed workmen's compensation leg-
islation. Now, workmen's compensation statutes exist in every state. See Horovitz, A
Veteran's View, 9 T rAL 35 (May-June 1972); Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation:
Half a Century of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1961). See generally
NATIONAL COms'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS REPORT (1972)
[hereinafter cited as NAT'L COMM'N REPORT]; Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen's
Compensation in the United States, 11 MAINE L. REV. 35 (1917).
3. See NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2 at 33-35; Grillo, supra note 1, at
251.
4. See Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half a Century of Judicial Develop-
ments, 41 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1961); Comment, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 161 (1962).
5. See 1 CAMPBELL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INSURANCE, PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE § 430 (1935) [hereinafter cited as CAMPBELL]; 1 HONNOLD, A TREATISE ON
THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS § 49 (1917); RIEsEN-
FELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 139-40 (1950); Horovitz, Workmen's
Compensation: Half a Century of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1961);
Comment, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 161 (1962).
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tort,6 and as a result, the scope of employee coverage was limited un-
necessarily.
An additional factor restricting the scope of employee coverage
was the economic rationale that had been used to gain passage of this
novel social legislation-the "enterprise theory" of liability.' Theo-
retically, the cost of the individual worker's injury was to be shouldered
by the responsible industry, with the cost being shifted ultimately to
the consumer through an increase in the price of the industry's product.8
When viewed as the basis for workmen's compensation coverage, the
enterprise theory excluded workers providing services in any way atypi-
cal.9 The result was varying state exclusions of these atypical em-
ployees, such as those employed by charitable and nonprofit institu-
tions, 10 domestic employees," independent contractors, 2 volunteer
workers, 13 and workers trying out for a job.' 4  While the enterprise
theory may have been necessary as a justification for the initial passage
of what was, at the time, extremely liberal social legislation, the focus
of modern concern should no longer be predominantly upon how the
employer will amortize his losses, but rather upon the injured and dis-
eased employees relegated to the "human scrap heap created by the
American industrial juggernaut."' 5
6. The unmade distinction was that the master-servant concept related to the
master's liability for injuries caused by the servant; whereas, the basic inquiry in com-
pensation cases involves which injuries to the employee should be insured against by
his employer. la LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 43.42 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON].
7. Comment, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 161, 165 (1962).
8. Id. "May it be the beginning of a well rounded out constitutional system
making every one who consumes any product of labor for hire pay his proportion-
ate amount of the cost of the creation representing the personal injury misfortunes of
those whose hands have enabled him to secure the objects of human desire, thus mini-
mizing the sufferings which are the natural incidents of industry and should be borne
.. . by the mass of mankind whose desires are administered to by such industry."
Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327, 381, 133 N.W. 209, 227 (1911). See Posey v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 245, 253-54, 350 P.2d 659, 664-65 (1960) (dissenting opinion);
cf. McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabili-
ties and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 389, 397-98 (1959).
9. Comment, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 161, 167 (1962). The most typical employee
(injured, for example, on an assembly line) is clearly covered by workmen's compen-
sation and has his costs easily shifted from the workman to the employer to the prod-
uct price, and ultimately to the consumer who purchases the product to which the
injured worker's services contributed.
10. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3352(c) (West 1971).
11. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3352(f) (West 1971).
12. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3357 (West 1971).
13. E.g., Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946).
14. E.g., Housman v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 15 Cal. Comp. Cases 242
(1950).
15. Ralph Nader Task Force Report on Job Safety and Health, Occupational Epi-
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Recent criticism' 6 of workmen's compensation is that it is fast be-
coming "creakingly obsolete."' 7  Harsh language often is directed at
the law's omission from coverage of many of the atypical workers that
most states erratically exclude.' 8 This current atmosphere of concern
for expansion of the scope of coverage is reflected by recent govern-
mental attempts at self-evaluation and reform at the state level.' 9 The
courts also are actively participating in efforts at liberalizing the ex-
tent of coverage, and more atypical working situations have been in-
cluded. 20  The California Supreme Court recently added momentum to
this liberalizing effort in Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board,2' when it held that an applicant for a job who was injured while
performing an agility test was an employee within the coverage of
workmen's compensation. The court held that the applicant was an
employee because he was rendering a service and benefit to the prospec-
tive employer and was under the employer's direction and control.2
This decision flies in the face of the statutory definition of employee,
which previously called for a "contract of hire' 23 and the long standing
judicial test that such a "contract" commenced only upon acceptance
for the job sought.24  This note will analyze the previous California
demic in St. Clair, Workmen's Compensation, 8 TRIAL 34 (May-June 1972) [herein-
after cited as Nader Report].
16. See generally Brodie, Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insur-
ance: A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. Rv. 57 (1963) [here-
inafter cited as Brodie]; O'Brien, A Modern Design, 8 TRIAL 37 (May-June 1972);
Page & O'Brien, The Inevitable Solution?, 8 TRIAL 42 (Jan.-Feb. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Page & O'Brien].
17. Nader Report, supra note 15, at 34.
18. See NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 43-52; Brodie, supra note 17,
at 74-77; Horovitz, A Veteran's View, 8 TRIAL 35 (May-June 1972); Page & O'Brien,
supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STUDY COMM'N REPORT
(1965); Linster, Priorities for the Future in Workmen's Compensation, 7 TIn FORUM
156, 157 (April 1972).
The federal government has also recognized the need to reevaluate present work-
men's compensation coverage. In 1971, the President appointed a national commission
to evaluate the systems of compensation in the United States. The yearlong study con-
cludes that the first of four basic objectives of reform be "broad coverage of employ-
ees and work-related injuries and diseases." The commission continues: "We recom-
mend that the term 'employee' be defined as broadly as possible. Doubts as to whether
a worker is an employee or a non-employee . . . should be resolved as to favor
workmen's compensation coverage." NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 48.
20. See generally 2 HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 8.02-.03 (2d ed. 1972).
21. Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 771, 494 P.2d 1,
100 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1972).
22. Id. at 780-83, 494 P.2d at 7-9, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85.
23. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351 (West 1971). See note 35 infra.
24. E.g., Sumner v. Edmunds, 130 Cal. App. 770, 21 P.2d 159 (1933). See
notes 47-60 & accompanying text infra.
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law on tryout injuries, the recent trend in other jurisdictions, and dis-
cuss the Laeng decision and its impact on the breadth of workmen's
compensation coverage for an employee.
Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
The California workmen's compensation laws contain a mandate
that the statutes applicable to coverage be liberally construed in favor
of inclusion of injured parties as benefit recipients.25  Considering this
statutory directive, the California Supreme Court in Laeng liberally in-
terpreted the statutory requirement of a contract for hire26 as a pre-
requisite to the commencement of an employment relationship. In so
doing, the court clarified who may qualify as an employee within the
purview and protection of California's workmen's compensation laws.
Laeng's claim was against the city of Covina, which was conduct-
ing physical agility tests as part of a tryout to screen applicants for
"refuse crew worker." The tests-situps, chinups, broad jump, and
obstacle course-were competitively scored; the type of exertion re-
quired was to simulate working conditions. The obstacle course was
timed to induce speed, and while hurrying along an elevated, hori-
zontal telephone pole, Laeng fell and seriously injured his foot. The
workmen's compensation referee overcame sympathy for the "equities"
of Laeng's claim and denied compensation coverage. 27 The Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) concluded that such an in-
jury during a tryout for a position was not compensable because Laeng
was not an employee of the city, and affirmed the referee's decision.2 1
The California Supreme Court, however, had a different concept
of employee for purposes of the workmen's compensation laws. Justice
Tobriner, breaking new ground for the state supreme court, 29 reversed
and sustained Laeng's claim, adjudging him an employee within the
definition of the California Labor Code. Section 3351 of that code de-
fines employee, for purposes of workmen's compensation, as "every
person in the service of an employer under any appointment or con-
tract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written
... .,oSection 3357 states that "Ia]ny person rendering service
for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless ex-
25. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202 (West 1971).
26. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351 (West 1971). See note 30 & accompanying text
infra.
27. Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 771, 774, 494 P.2d
1, 2, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377, 378 (1972).
28. Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 36 Cal. Comp. Cases 518
(1971).
29. The sole dissent was by Justice McComb. 6 Cal. 3d 771, 783, 494 P.2d 1,
9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1972).
30. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351 (West 1971).
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pressly excluded herein, is presumed to be an employee."31  Within
this statutory context, Justice Tobriner added a concise recital of perti-
nent California compensation cases, inducing an inference that Laeng
is an unquestionable outgrowth of previous decisions, both adminis-
trative and judicial. However, this understated the confusion surround-
ing the law prior to Laeng.
Contract of Hire-A Test of an
Employment Relationship
The nucleus of the previous confusion can be traced to the early
application of tort doctrines to the workmen's compensation system2l--
that is, the common law notion of a contract of hire as a prerequisite
in creating an employment relationship. 3 Clearly Laeng recovered as
an employee without any contract of hire. Moreover, the court ex-
pressly refused to be constrained by the technical contractual concept:
Although we recognize that at the time of his injury the claimant
was not yet "employed" by the city in any contractual sense, we are
not confined, in determining whether Laeng may be considered an
"employee" for the purposes of workmen's compensation, to finding
whether or not the city and Laeng had entered into a traditional con-
tract of hire.34
31. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3357 (West 1971).
32. For a comprehensive explanation of why the common law, tort-oriented defi-
nition of servant should never have been superimposed upon the workmen's compen-
sation concept of employee, and the confusion engendered as a result see 1 LARsON,
supra note 6, §§ 1.20-2.
The following excerpt from Campbell's 1935 treatise on California workmen's com-
pensation law illustrates the pervasiveness of this confusion: "There is no distinction
between the terms 'servant' and 'employee.' While the [workmen's compensation]
Act furnishes its own definition of master and servant, the common-law definition re-
mains essentially unchanged." 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 5, at 387.
33. See RmSENFELD & MAxWELL, supra note 5.
34. 6 Cal. 3d at 776, 494 P.2d at 4, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 380 (emphasis added).
The court relied on the explicit use of disjunctives in the Labor Code definition of em-
ployee as support for its rejection of the contention that a contract of hire is in it-
self a prerequisite for recovery. Id. at 777, 494 P.2d at 4, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 380. The
code defines an employee as "Every person in the service of an employer under any
appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship . . . ." CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351
(West 1971). However, Laeng does not qualify as an "appointee" nor as an "appren-
tice."
Clearly there is no apprenticeship agreement. Similarly, the provision in the statu-
tory definition for creating an employment relationship by appointment is inapplicable.
An appointment's significance is largely relegated to claims involving injured appoint-
ees to public positions and the relationship .created thereby usually has the character-
istic traits of a contract of hire, such as consent of the parties. Additionally, it is still
questionable whether such an appointed public officer qualifies as an employee for
compensation purposes unless he is receiving remuneration on some basis. See gener-
ally 2 HANNA, CALiFoRNA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
lOnN §§ 3.01-.03 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 2 HANNA]. Thus, the court in
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In fact, never has a California court been less "confined" in prior deci-
sions relating to this area of workmen's compensation. 5
As recently as 1968, Hanna had seemingly restated the present
position of California law on tryout situations in his treatise on Califor-
nia workmen's compensation: "Persons who are trying out for a job
are not employees of the prospective employer unless they are being
paid for the try-out time . . . . Until the applicant is accepted by an
authorized agent of the employer, the relation of employer and em-
ployee is not established. ' 36  The limits of coverage were dependent
on a judicially imposed test of an employment relationship which is
based upon acceptance of the claimant for the job by an authorized
agent.37 Under this test, the atypical situation of an injury during a
tryout was excluded, except when the claimant received remunerative
consideration for the tryout. 38  In order to satisfy this contract ele-
ment, a prospective employee had to be formally accepted for the po-
sition or receive pay for the tryout itself. The only inroad, then, to
allowing recovery for a tryout injury before contractual acceptance of
Laeng is dealing solely with the statutory requirement of a contract of hire, but not in
the traditional way. See notes 73-79 & accompanying text infra.
35. See notes 36-38, 47-72 & accompanying text infra.
The requirement of a contract for hire is ubiquitous in most state workmen's com-
pensation definitions or interpretations of employment. See BLAIR, REFERENCE GUIDE
TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.01 (1972) [citing 26 exemplary jurisdictions, in-
cluding the California case, Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Assurance Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 101, 22 P.2d 572 (1933)].
Blair concludes: "A valid and enforceable contract [of hire] is the basis of an em-
ployer-employee relationship, and the general rules of contract are applicable thereto."
Id. at 5-3 n.8.
In California, Campbell's treatise on workmen's compensation states in no uncer-
tain terms that to qualify as an employee, "[a] contract of employment, express or
implied, is . . .an essential element in creating the [necessary] relationship." I CAMP-
BELL, supra note 5, at 393.
It is interesting to note that in this area, Campbell also limits the mandate of liberal
interpretation of Labor Code section 3202, upon which the Laeng opinion relied. "While
the Act is remedial in its objectives, and should receive a liberal construction in favor
of those entitled to its benefits, before one is permitted to claim such benefits so liber-
ally interpreted, he should be held to strict proof that he is in a class embraced within
the provisions of the statute, and nothing can be presumed or inferred in this respect.
• .. This much of his showing is jurisidctional and must be established by competent
legal proof." I CAMPBELL, supra note 5, at 397 (emphasis added).
36. 2 HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION 8 (2d ed. 1972) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Sumner v. Edmunds, 130 Cal.
App. 770, 21 P.2d 159 (1933); Housman v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 15 Cal. Comp.
Cases 242 (1950); Gitterman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 5 Cal. Comp.
Cases 181 (1940).
37. E.g., Sumner v. Edmunds, 130 Cal. App. 770, 21 P.2d 159 (1933).
38. E.g., Gitterman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 5 Cal. Comp. Cases 181
(1940).
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the job was if the pre-employment test formed a transactional relation-
ship on its own, that is, a pre-employment contract of sorts.
California Law Prior to Laeng
Also contrary to the inference in Justice Tobriner's opinion that
Laeng reflects well-settled principles of California law are the obvious
discrepancies between Laeng and prior California cases. It is, there-
fore, important to trace these earlier judicial and administrative deci-
sions. The earliest relevant compensation case is Hippensteel v. County
of Fresno,39 decided in 1917. The claimant was offered a tryout for
a job as porter on the condition that if he could perform the requisite
tasks, he would be hired and paid. Injured shortly after beginning
the tryout, he was awarded compensation without any mention of
whether a contract of hire had been found or implied. The Indus-
trial Accident Commission simply reasoned that although the claimant
"was only being tested to see whether he could perform the duties of
the position, nevertheless he was an employee while thus tentatively
engaged."
40
Decided only six years after the compensation laws became effec-
tive, Hippensteel sacrificed clear explanation of the commission's analy-
sis for brevity. There is no mention of the contract of hire obstacle in
the commission's conclusions. It seems plausible that in the sprit of re-
form pervasive in the first decade of this social legislation, 41 the com-
mission chose to follow the equities42 of the Hippensteel claim rather
than be constrained by technicalities. Subsequent decisions for the
next half a century, however, indicate that Hippensteel was something
of a liberal anomaly. 43  Subsequent to Hippensteel, the contract re-
quirement became the point of commencement for compensation cov-
erage and gradually narrowed the scope of coverage. The contrac-
tual element of acceptance for the position began to be recognized as a
prerequisite for finding a claimant within the orbit of an employer-em-
ployee relationship. The necessity of this element of acceptance was
39. 4 I.A.C. 304 (1917).
40. Id.
41. See NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2 at 34; cf. Horovitz, Half a Century
of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1961).
42. The fundamental purpose of all workmen's compensation laws is to protect
any individual from special risks in an employment context, and to provide for the in-
jured individual by placing the financial burden indirectly upon the employer who re-
ceives service and benefit from the individual and is presumably more capable of
shouldering it. See 2 HANNA, supra note 34, at § 1.05(l)-(2). See generally 1
LARSON, supra note 6, at § 2.20.
43. E.g., California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 40 Cal. App.
465, 181 P. 112 (1919). See generally Horovitz, Half a Century of Judicial Develop-
ments, 41 NEB. L. RPv. 1 (1961).
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demonstrated in Beatty v. San Diego Electric Railway Co.,44 where a
student motorman was injured while learning his routes, and again in
Gwartney v. Western Aviation Co.,4 5 where a pilot was injured while
familiarizing himself with a plane before carrying passengers. The com-
mission held that both claimants, though working at their jobs without
pay, were within the orbit of compensation coverage. In both cases,
however, the commission noted that the claimants had offered to work
and had been tentatively accepted for the jobs with which they were ac-
quainting themselves, thus supplying the necessary contractual ele-
ment.46
This element of acceptance by the employer became a judicially
formalized requirement when an appellate court in California Highway
Commission v. Industrial Accident Commission47 overturned an award
to a job applicant injured in a car collision. The claimant was en-
route to a job site appointment with a foreman for final approval and
commencement of work. The claimant had been sent by the High-
way Commission's superintendent with the vehicle and driver provided
by the commission. Nonetheless, without the foreman's final accept-
ance, the claimant was held not to be an employee and was excluded
from coverage.4
Highway Commission was cited with approval fourteen years later
in another appellate decision, Sumner v. Edmunds. 9 An aspiring
newspaper boy was injured while riding in an automobile driven by an
employee of the newspaper publisher. The boy was being shown a
paper route prior to possible acceptance for a delivery job when the
collision and injury occurred. Given these facts, the employee concept
was argued from a different perspective. Contrary to the customary
situation where the injured claimant seeks to establish an employee
status for compensation qualification, in Sumner it was the defendant
publishing corporation that sought to establish the boy was an em-
ployee, thereby disqualifying him from relief under the California guest
statute.50 In keeping with the equities of the case, the court held that
44. 5 I.A.C. 241 (1918).
45. 7 I.A.C. 5 (1920).
46. Also, the facts could support coverage as apprentices within the meaning
of Labor Code section 3351, although the case opinions were, again, inconclusive as to
the actual basis of this issue's resolution.
47. 40 Cal. App. 465, 181 P. 112 (1919).
48. This case is an excellent illustration of a bad result when a technical con-
straint on coverage supplants the equities of the facts at hand. It is illustrative of
the strict, narrow interpretation of the extent of compensation coverage often found in
earlier cases. See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
49. 130 Cal. App. 770, 778, 21 P.2d 159, 163 (1933).
50. Id. Often, courts invoke more stringent requirements of proof of an em-
ployment relationship when this relationship is utilized as an employer's defense to a
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the boy was not an employee and expressly indicated that he failed to
meet the requisite standards. "A mere offer of services not yet ac-
cepted by the prospective employer is not sufficient to make the offeree
an employee."51  This language set the tone of the law at that time,
clearly marking the point at which an employment relationship arises to
be simultaneous with the commencement of such a contract for hire.52
The Gitterman-Seale Exception
The contractual principles espoused in Sumner were generally ad-
hered to in subsequent commission cases53 until the decision in Gitter-
man v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.54 Gitterman represented
a significant modification of earlier cases requiring formal acceptance
of a job applicant before the employee status arose. The claimant was
a motion picture extra who was injured while being fitted for an au-
dition costume, prior to acceptance for any part. The commission con-
sidered the claimant an employee, asserting that even if she had not
been accepted for the part, she was to have received financial reim-
bursement for her tryout time. On similar facts, a dancer injured dur-
ing audition was granted compensation in Scale v. Columbia Pictures
Corp.55 This claimant was also being reimbursed for the audition it-
self, and the commission found, as a basis for its award, that "the dem-
onstration was given for the company's benefit, and was paid for by
the company ... "56
These two cases clearly contribute to Hanna's evaluation that
"[p]ersons who are trying out for a job are not employees of the pro-
spective employer unless they are being paid for the try-out time
... .,5 His emphasis was only placed on a part of the Scale ra-
common law action, rather than when asserted by an injured individual seeking com-
pensation. la LARsON, supra note 6, at § 47.42(a).
51. 130 Cal. App. at 778, 21 P.2d at 163.
52. Directly contradictory to the conclusions in Laeng, Sumner was expressly
overruled in the Laeng opinion. 6 Cal. 3d 771, 779 n.8, 494 P.2d 1, 7, n.8, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 382 n.8 (1972).
53. See Bennewitz v. Buchanan Olds, Inc., 8 Cal. Comp. Cases 190 (1943)
(claimant was injured while being shown the workshop premises, before beginning ac-
tual labor, but after being accepted for the job by the Buchanan manager. The com-
mission found the claimant an employee, entitled to compensation.). See also Union
Lumber Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 12 Cal. App. 2d 588, 55 P.2d 911 (1936)
(an injured butcher's apprentice was awarded compensation. Although the claimant re-
ceived no direct monetary compensation for his work, the court found that his in-
structions in the butcher's trade as consideration to establish a contract of em-
ployment, thereby qualifying the claimant for compensatory benefits.).
54. 5 Cal. Comp. Cases 181 (1940).
55. 6 Cal. Comp. Cases 306 (1941).
56. Id.
57. 2 HANNA, supra note 34, at 8.
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tionale: that the claimant was a paid applicant.58  Gitterman and
Seale thus modified the strict contractual rule to the extent that claim-
ants receiving remuneration from prospective employers could be em-
ployees within workmen's compensation.
The Effects of Sumner
Still adhering to Sumner's narrow contractual interpretation of
employee, a series of harsh decisions were reached. In 1945, in Simp-
son v. Industrial Accident Commission, 9 a thirty year old temporary
deputy sheriff, Simpson, took a physical fitness examination on his day
off from work in an attempt to qualify for permanent deputy sheriff.
Simpson died four days later of coronary thrombosis. The commission
held the injury noncompensable and not arising out of and occurring
in the course of his employment as temporary deputy, despite the fact
that his job required him to be on twenty-four hour call. Moreover,
temporary deputies were encouraged to take the test, presumably to
give the county's permanent staff the service and benefits of pretrained
and already proven personnel. Nevertheless, Simpson had not yet been
accepted for the position sought and, without such contract of hire, was
denied compensatory coverage.
60
In 1950, in Housman v. Industrial Accident Commission," a
young dancer injured her leg during an uncompensated audition. The
leg injury developed a tumor and, within two years, resulted in the
young girl's death. The commission's opinion expressly disregarded the
transportation reimbursement the girl was to receive for auditioning,
dismissing this as being no payment for any services rendered. Fur-
thermore, more explicitly than in Simpson, the commission viewed the
tryout as "solely an offer of her services to a prospective employer. '6 2
Since the requisite acceptance and contractual knot were absent, the
injury was held noncompensable.
The Liberal Trend
Simpson and Housman were the narrowest interpretations of the
employee concept. Perhaps the commission was reluctant to burden
employers with claims as serious as these wrongful deaths on such ten-
58. The Laeng case, however, will shift the emphasis to the fact that the claim-
ant was providing a service "given for the company's benefit." See notes 74-79 & ac-
companying text infra.
59. 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 106 (1945).
60. One issue in Simpson was the lack of evidence showing a causal relation be-
tween the fitness test and ensuing death from heart disease. This may account for
what, on the surface, seems an unduly harsh decision against the claimant. Obviously,
causation was not an issue in the facts of Laeng.
61. 15 Cal. Comp. Cases 242 (1950).
62. Id.
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uous causation absent any clear contract of hire. In any event, over
a decade later, this restrictive trend was redirected by judicial inter-
vention.
As concern for the individual worker and the review of the pro-
visions of social insurance increased, 63 the courts began taking more
latitude with the extent of coverage. One particularly flexible portion
of the statutory language was the provision allowing an employment
relationship to arise from an implied contract of hire.64 Imaginatively
utilized, the technical constraint of a contract of hire could be satisfied
without sacrificing the equities of the claim.
With the groundwork for Laeng now taking shape, an appellate
court decided Department of Water & Power v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Board.5 The claimant was already a city employee,
injured while trying out for a new city position on his day off from
work. Without pay and without direction or advice from his superiors,
he took a physical agility test with all other applicants and received
compensation from the board for his resulting injury. Affirming the
award, an appellate court acknowledged the board's view of a tryout
as performance of special tasks pertinent to the job sought to be "for
the joint benefit of the employer and the employee."66 The court ex-
pressly left open the question of whether an applicant not already a
city employee could have recovered on the same basic facts.
67
63. See notes 15-20 & accompanying text supra.
64. In 1960, a football player on scholarship was killed while traveling with his
school athletic team. The appellate court overturned the commission's denial of
compensation, implying a contract of hire and explicitly emphasizing the Labor Codes
mandate for a liberal construction in favor of inclusion of the injured party. Van Horn
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963). In
a similar case a prisoner loaned to the city for labor, reimbursed with cigarettes and
credit toward his sentence, was injured. Again the appellate court reversed the board's
refusal of compensation, finding another contract of hire and stressing the need for
liberal statutory interpretation. Pruitt v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 261 Cal. App.
2d 546, 68 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1968).
65. 252 Cal. App. 2d 744, 60 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1967).
66. Id. at 745, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 830. The court elaborated on factors aiding its
conclusion that benefits were incurred by the employer: "In the instant case the em-
ployee was injured on premises controlled by the employer while he was engaged, not
in recreational activity, but in an activity directed and controlled by the employer in
the furtherance of the employer's business. It is a reasonable inference that the em-
ployer's interest was being furthered by the employee's attendance and participation ih
the activity." Id. at 747, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
This element of direction and control by the prospective employer is also an ex-
press factor in the subsequent Laeng decision. See notes 95-96 & accompanying text
infra.
67. Id. at 748, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 831. Justice Tobriner pointed out in the Laeng
opinion that this, in effect, is the question determined in Laeng. 6 Cal. 3d 771, at
681 n.9, 494 P.2d 1 at 8 n.9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377 at 383 n.9.
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Judicial emphasis continued to shift away from the constraining
common law contractual notions and any requirement of remuneration.
Rather the courts focused on whether the applicant was providing a
service for the employer. 68 Likewise, the parameters of the employee
concept continued to become increasingly malleable. 69 For example,
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board granted compensation
to a student nurse injured while receiving hospital training.7" The
board, straining to find an implied contract of hire,71 made apparent
its willingness to apply the Labor Code mandate favoring liberal con-
struction, but still more apparent was the confusion over whether the
contract requirement remained essential. The board stated, "It ap-
pears manifest under statutory and case law that a contractual relation-




This was the muddled state of the law which the California Su-
preme Court faced in Laeng. The employer contended that no con-
tract of hire existed when the injury occurred and that the elements of
consideration were missing since Laeng was receiving no remuneration
for taking the test.73 Furthermore, it was contended that Laeng was
not performing services which would allow compensation. Unfettering
itself of the overly confining view that employment is created solely
by a contractual relationship, 4 the court focused on the respondent's
second contention and scrutinized the "substance and essence"
75 of
the relationship in this tryout situation. The court was not detoured by
whether the prospective employer paid the applicant for the tryout.
76
68. See Smith v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 69 CaL 2d 814, 447 P.2d 365, 73
Cal. Rptr. 253 (1968).
69. In Pruitt v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, the court instructed:
"When the board is determining the status of a petitioner as an 'employee,' it must
look to the substance and essence of the relationship between the petitioner and the
party sought to be charged as the employer." 261 Cal. App. 2d 546, 552, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 12, 16 (1968) (emphasis added).
70. Anaheim Gen. Hosp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 35 Cal. Comp. Cases 2
(1970).
71. See note 64 & accompanying text supra.
72. 35 Cal. Comp. Cases at 6.
73. 6 Cal. 3d at 777 n.5, 494 P.2d at 4 n.5, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 380 n.5. The fact
that Laeng was receiving no pay for taking the test eliminates any implication of a con-
tract of hire. See note 67 & accompanying text supra. Also eliminated is any invo-
cation of the Gitterman-Seale exception. See notes 54-57 & accompanying text supra.
74. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
75. See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
76. See note 73 supra.
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As a competitor for a job, Laeng clearly was not volunteering his serv-
ices. 77  The significant consideration was what the applicant provided
for the prospective employer-benefits and service in a hazardous em-
ployment context under the direction and control of the employer. 8
Thus, the court placed great weight on section 3357 of the Labor Code,
emphasizing its requirement that, "Any person rendering service for
another. . . is presumed to be an employee." 79
Other Jurisdictions
Whether there is a sufficient service or benefit rendered in such
a tryout situation to justify workmen's compensation coverage of the ap-
plicant as an employee has been considered recently in other jurisdic-
tions. The novelty of the facts, coupled with the lack of California
precedents directly in point, induced the court's serious consideration
of the decisions in other jurisdictions on this issue. The Laeng court
placed considerable reliance on two New York decisions, Smith v. Ve-
nezian Lamp Co.8 0 and Bode v. 0. & W. Restaurant."' Smith, a pro-
spective lamp polisher, and Bode, a prospective pantry chef, were in-
jured while trying out for these positions and sought compensation.
The technical obstacle of finding or circumventing any requisite con-
tract of hire did not restrain the New York courts. The New York
Workmen's Compensation Law defines employee in pertinent part as
"[a] person engaged in . . . the service of an employer whose principal
business is that of carrying on or conducting a hazardous employ-
ment . *..."82 As such, the crux of these New York decisions was
the statement in Venezian that, "A tryout is for the benefit of the em-
ployer as well as the applicant, and if it involves a hazardous job we
see no valid reason why the applicant should not be entitled to the
protection of the statute.
83
A Texas court has also suggested that its workmen's compensation
coverage is applicable to pre-employment activities, engaged in "not
77. Cf. Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946).
78. See note 58 & accompanying text supra.
79. 6 Cal. 3d 771 at 777, 494 P.2d 1 at 4, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377 at 380 (1972) (em-
phasis by the court). Labor Code section 3351 also requires that an employee, by defini-
tion, be "in the service of an employer. . . ." (emphasis added).
80. 5 App. Div. 2d 12, 168 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1957).
81. 9 App. Div. 2d 969, 193 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1959).
82. N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoWP. LAW § 2(4) (McKinney 1965).
83. Smith v. Venezian Lamp Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 12, 14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766
(1957) (emphasis added). See Cameron v. State Theatre Co., 256 Mass. 466, 152
N.E. 880 (1926); Sones v. Thompson Furniture Co., 163 Pa. 392, 62 A.2d 116 (1948);
cf. Warren's Case, 326 Mass. 718, 97 N.E.2d 184 (1951); Ott v. Consolidated Under-
writers, 311 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. App. 1958); Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, 206 S.C. 103,
33 S.E.2d 81 (1945).
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for the benefit of the applicant, but wholly for the benefit of the em-
ployer and under its direction and control." 4  This unusually strong
statement forsakes any requirement of bilaterality inherent in any con-
tract of hire, 85 and focuses solely upon the unilateral consideration mov-
ing from the worker-claimant.8 6 The California Supreme Court ap-
pears to have utilized this same unilateral theory in Laeng.
Conclusion
The novelty of the tryout injury has not produced sufficient re-
cent litigation to strongly indicate a national trend on the specific is-
sue.87 However, the holdings of Venezian and Laeng are unchallenged
84. Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963) (dictum) citing Smith v. Venezian Lamp Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 12, 168 N.Y.S.2d
764 (1957).
This was a personal injury action in which the plaintiff alleged negligence on the
part of the defendant company for failure to inform the plaintiff of an active tuber-
culin condition, allegedly revealed by chest x-rays taken as part of plaintiff's examina-
tion prior to beginning work. Summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed on
the ground that the plaintiff was an employee and therefore her remedy was confined
to workmen's compensation. She had no basis for relief under workmen's compensa-
tion since she had alleged an occupational disease, which is consistently non-com-
pensable under Texas Workmen's Compensation law.
The decision appears to have been reached in spite of the equities of the case and
contrary to the general policy of requiring more conclusive proof of an employment re-
lationship when the relationship is used as an employer's defense to a common law ac-
tion rather than to qualify an injured party for workmen's compensation. See note 50
& accompanying text supra.
85. The Texas statutory definition of "employee" is framed solely in terms of
a contract of hire. Tax. REv. CiV. STAT. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
86. Lotspeich lends support to Laeng in another vein. The California Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Board distinguished Laeng from Venezian and Bode be-
cause the tryouts in the New York cases had the applicants performing the tasks of
the actual positions sought. 6 Cal. 3d at 780, 494 P.2d at 7, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
Thus the service and benefits to the employer were more tangible than a mere agility
test.
This distinction seems to confine service and benefits to the formula of the enter-
prise theory. See notes 7-15 & accompanying text supra. Even though the claimants
in Venezian and Bode were only trying out for their positions, they were performing
a constructive part of the work operation, designed to prepare a product for consumer
purchase. Whereas, in the more atypical Laeng and Lotspeich cases, there are no im-
mediate financial benefits to the employer from the employee's physical examination
prior to beginning work.
The Laeng opinion that to distinguish whether the applicant was trying out on-
the-job is to over-emphasize the significance of the format of the tryout. Id. at 781,
494 P.2d at 7, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 383. Similarly, the Lotspeich opinion did not al-
low the format of the examination to preclude a finding of benefit to the employer
originating therein. "In the case before us, the physical examination was conducted
. . . wholly for the benefit of the employer." 369 S.W.2d at 709 (emphasis added).
87. Varying state statutory definitions of an employee compound the lack of
uniformity on decisions. Larson's treatise, for example, can only inconclusively
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by any recent judicial decisions. Beyond their obvious effect in their
respective jurisdictions of extending compensation coverage to indi-
viduals injured in the tryout context, the courts' underlying theme has
a broader impact. They have sidestepped technical obstacles and nar-
row interpretations of statutory language advanced in earlier decisions88
to reach the fundamental purposes of workmen's compensation law-
protecting the working man from any special risks present in an employ-
ment context.89
In California,9 ° as in numerous other states,9 ' coverage had been
limited by insistence on a contract of hire as the means of creating an
employment relationship. The Laeng court chose to relegate this un-
necessarily rigid constraint to its proper perspective of being a useful
guideline 92 which should not obfuscate the equities of the injured
workman's claim." Moreover, Laeng indicates that the contract of
hire test is not categorically superimposed upon the workmen's com-
pensation concept of employee.
[W]e believe that an "employment" relationship sufficient to bring
the act into play cannot be determined simply from technical con-
tractual or common law conceptions of employment but must
instead be resolved by reference to the history and fundamental
purposes underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act.94
Dissecting the employee concept for compensation qualification,
the Laeng opinion acknowledges the factor of control95 exercised by
the employer over the workman when injury occurs and the special risk
imposed since the workman is under the employer's direction.96 The key
element, though, seems to be that the workman render service and
benefit to the prospective employer.97 Even without a formal contrac-
tual offer and acceptance of a job per se, this flow of consideration to
the employer may be sufficient to invoke the employer's responsibility
for an individual injured while providing such service and benefit. As-
suming that the injured individual has satisfied this service and benefit
summarize, "some close cases arise when injury occurs during a tryout period." la
IAnsON, supra note 6, at 779.
88. See notes 47-60 & accompanying text supra.
89. See note 42 supra.
90. See notes 47-60 & accompanying text supra.
91. See, e.g., Tnx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
92. 6 Cal. 3d at 777-78 n.7, 494 P.2d at 4-5 n.7, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81 n.7.
93. The referee initially hearing the Laeng claim observed that, "'[a]Ithough
the equities appear to be in favor of applicant, [the] law appears to preclude a finding
of employment' .... ." Id. at 776, 494 P.2d at 4, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (emphasis
added).
94. Id. at 777, 494 P.2d at 4-5, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
95. Id. at 783, 494 P.2d at 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 780-83, 494 P.2d at 7-9, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85.
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test, the court has equated the commencement of the employment re-
lationship with when the risks of the employment relationship begin
to operate. 8 Whether criticized as judicial legislation or praised as
reasonably stretching the statutory language to suit the equities and pur-
poses of the legislation, this is presently the law in California.
Viewing the impact of Laeng in its broadest spectrum, the deci-
sion seems entirely consonant with the recently renewed concern for the
adequacy and equity of compensation for workmen. 9 The laws were
engendered in an atmosphere of concern for the individual employees
who had become the cogs and victims of the Industrial Revolution's
relentless economic advance. But shortsighted statutory drafting'
coupled with narrow interpretations of the law' did not provide the
means for an equitable result in all cases. The scope of compensa-
tion coverage, particularly its erratic, categorical exclusions of certain
atypical workers, is now under considerable fire.' The legislatures are
not altogether deaf, 103 and Laeng clearly indicates that neither are
the courts.
Randall Wulff*
98. Id. at 782-83, 494 P.2d at 8, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
99. See notes 15-20 & accompanying text supra. See generally 2 HANNA, supra
note 34, § 8.02.
100. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 47-60 & accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 15-20 & accompanying text supra.
103. See note 19 & accompanying text supra. See generally Skolnik & Price, An-
other Look at Workmen's Compensation, 33 Social Security Bull. 3 (1970).
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